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Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v. Dobson:
The Implementation of the Purposes of the
Federal Arbitration Act or an Unjustified
Intrusion into State Sovereignty?

In Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v. Dobson,' the United States
Supreme Court held that section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA) 2 was applicable to contract actions which were brought in state
court. The controversy began with a house originally owned by Mr. and
Mrs. Gwin in Fairhope, Alabama. In 1987, the Gwins purchased a
lifetime termite protection plan from the local Allied-Bruce Terminix
office, a franchise of Terminix International. The termite protection plan
was to protect the house "'against the attack of subterranean termites,'
to reinspect the house periodically, to provide any 'further treatment
found necessary,' and to repair, up to $100,000, damage caused by new
termite infestations." 3 The contract also contained an arbitration clause
which indicated "any controversy or claim.., arising out of or relating
to the interpretation, performance or breach of any provision of this
In 1991, the
agreement shall be settled exclusively by arbitration.
Gwins had Allied-Bruce reinspect the house because the Dobsons were
interested in purchasing the house. The house was given a clean bill of
health.' As soon as the Dobsons bought the house, they discovered that
it was swarming with termites. Allied-Bruce was not able to adequately
remedy the infestations., The Dobsons sued the Gwins, Allied-Bruce,
and Terminix International in an Alabama state court, claiming breach
of contract, fraud and negligence. The Gwins cross-claimed against
Allied-Bruce and Terminix International.7 Allied-Bruce and Terminix
requested a stay, pending arbitration, as indicated in the plan's contract

1.

115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).

2. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (1988).
3. 115 S. Ct. at 837.
4. Id.

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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and by application of section 2 of the FAA. The state court denied the
stay by applying the restrictive "substantial contemplation" test to
determine if the FAA was applicable. That test only allows the
application of the FAA where "at the time [the parties entered into the
contract] and accepted the arbitration clause, they contemplated
substantial interstate activity."' The court found that the FAA did not
apply to this contract and instead applied the Alabama law which makes
"written, predispute arbitration agreements invalid and 'unenforceable.'"9 Allied-Bruce and Terminix appealed to the Alabama Supreme
Court which upheld the denial of the stay, finding that the FAA was
inapplicable to this contract "because the connection between the termite
contract and interstate commerce was too slight."" The court applied
the substantial contemplation test, which Allied-Bruce and Terminix
appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed both decisions of the
lower courts."
The Federal Arbitration Act was passed in 1925 in an attempt to limit
the common law restrictions in the use of arbitration. The scope of the
FAA was not clearly defined at the time of its passage, so the evolution
of its application must be outlined in order to understand the history
behind the decision in Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v. Dobson. 2
In 1956, the Supreme Court decided Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.,' 3
where the issue before the Court involved the applicability of the FAA
in state courts.' 4 The case revolved around a labor dispute which
involved an arbitration clause in an employment contract. 5 The
decision in Bernhardt avoided the issue of the applicability of the FAA
in a state court by holding that the contract in dispute did not involve
interstate commerce and thus was not covered by the FAA."6 The
Court gave no rationale as to why this contract did not "evidence
commerce," but merely made the broad statement, "Nor does this
contract evidence 'a transaction in interstate commerce' within the
meaning of section 2 of the Act." 7 Over a decade later, the Supreme
Court again faced the question of the FAA's applicability in PrimaPaint

8. Id. (quoting Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382,387
(2d Cir. 1961) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring), cert denied, 82 S. Ct. 31 (1961)).
9. Id. (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 628 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1993)).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).
13. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 199.
16. Id,at 201.
17. Id.
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This controversy was

not originally filed in state court but instead in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. 9 The dispute
was based on a breach of a consulting agreement containing an
arbitration clause with federal subject matter jurisdiction based on
diversity.2" The Supreme Court held that this contract did evidence
interstate commerce, and therefore the FAA was controlling in this
controversy.21 This case expanded the prior application of the FAA,
which was formerly limited to federal question cases only, to all cases
brought in federal court 22 regardless of whether federal jurisdiction was
based on a federal question2' or diversity jurisdiction.' This expansion made it clear that the Supreme Court found that the FAA was not
passed under the Article III power of the Constitution' (which would
limit its application to only federal question cases), but instead the FAA
was passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause' (which makes the FAA
federal substantive law). The Court in Prima Paint indicated that the
agreement clearly involved interstate commerce. Like the decision in
Bernhardt,the Court gave no reasoning for the conclusion, but merely
stated "There could not be a clearer case of a contract evidencing a
transaction in interstate commerce." 27 In 1983, the Supreme Court
decided Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp.,28 reaffirming that the FAA created a body of federal substantive
law and, therefore, should be applicable in both federal and state
courts. 29

The following year, the Supreme Court reinforced the

0
applicability of the FAA in state courts in Southland Corp. v. Keating."
The Court reversed the California Supreme Court, which enforced a
California statute prohibiting the enforcement of arbitration clauses."'
The Supreme Court held that state courts could not refuse to apply the
FAA when the contract containing the arbitration clauses evidence a

18.
19.
20.
21.

388 U.S. 395 (1967).
Id. at 398.
Id.
Id. at 401.

22. Stanley D. Bynum, et al., The Supreme Court'sDecision on Terminix Reaffirms the
Scope of the FAA, DisP. RESOL. J. 9 (1995).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
25. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 8.
27. 388 U.S. at 401. See also Bynum et al., supra, note 22, at 9.
28. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
29. Id. See also Bynum et al., supra note 22, at 9.
30. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
31. Id. at 16.
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transaction in interstate commerce. 2 Thus, the Supreme Court clearly
established that the FAA created federal substantive law, pursuant to
the Commerce Clause power,33 which is applicable in both federal and
state courts. The FAA applies to any contract which evidences
commerce and pre-empts any contravening state law. The phrase
"evidencing commerce" of section 2 has not had a clear or consistent
application since the passage of the FAA. The two Supreme Court cases
prior to Terminix which discussed that phrase, Bernhardt and Prima
Paint, provided little to no analysis of the phrase. Both cases merely
drew conclusions about whether a contract did or did not evidence
commerce, with no further explanation."6 Until Terminix, two distinct
interpretations of the phrase "evidencing commerce" existed: 1) A broad
test which encompassed any contract which "affects interstate commerce"3 6 and; 2) A more restrictive test which would include any
contract which contemplated substantial interstate commerce at the time
the contract was entered into. 7 The existence of these two tests
created a great disparity in the enforceability of the arbitration clause
by the varying applicability of the FAA in each state court.'
Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v. Dobson 9 has two holdings which
are significant to the development of arbitration in the United States
and, specifically, section 2 of the FAA.'
The Court held: (1) The
phrase "evidencing a transaction in interstate commerce" means that
interstate commerce in fact must be proven before the FAA is applicable

32. Id.
33. U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 8.
34. Bynum et al., supra note 22, at 10.
35. Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act's Interstate Commerce
Requirement: What's Left for State Law? 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 385, 414 (1992).
36. Bynum et al., supra note 22, at 10.
37. 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 1961) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring). In his concurrence
in Metro Indus. PaintingCorp. u. Terminal Constr. Co., Judge Lumbard argued that his

test balances the interests implicit in the Supremacy Clause: state sovereignty and federal
interest in consistent application of the law. Id. at 386. The FAA did not provide a clear
mandate, so Judge Lumbard encouraged the use of a cautious approach. Id. Judge
Lumbard also argued that his test would closely meet the expectations of the parties. Id.
The fact that it is necessary for one party to cross state lines in order to fulfill
obligations arising out of the contract should not by itself bring the arbitration
clause within the reach of the federal statute. The Arbitration Act should apply
only when the parties know or have reason to believe that the performance of the
contract will require substantial interstate movement.
Id. at 388.
38. 115 S. Ct. at 838.
39. 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).
40. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
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to the contract at issue;41 and (2) section 2 of the FAA is applicable in
state courts and pre-empts any contravening state law, so long as the2
contract at issue involves or affects interstate commerce "in fact."1
Considering the first holding, this was the first time the Supreme Court
interpreted the phrase, "evidencing a transaction in interstate commerce," and conclusively resolved the dispute between the prior two
The Court
approaches to that phrase of section 2 of the FAA.'
resolved the dispute, crystallizing the effect of the FAA on state rights.
The Court found that a "commerce in fact" test would be the superior
approach, reasoning that this test implements the intent of the enacting
Congress." In 1925, Congress passed the FAA, specifically section 2,
pursuant to the power of the Commerce Clause;* it would be inconsistent for the application of the FAA not to extend as far as the commerce
clause power reaches." The Court held that the commerce in fact test
would provide for universal enforcement of arbitration clauses wherever
Congress' jurisdiction extends. 4 The commerce in fact test prevents
the FAA from extending beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause.'
Arbitration clauses will not be enforced in contracts that do not in fact
involve interstate commerce. The Court concluded that the application
of the commerce in fact test will put arbitration clauses in those
contracts on equal footing with other contract provisions, thus meeting
the goals of the FAA.49 The Court established a clear test which would
clearly define and limit the encroachment on state rights. The Court
expressly rejected the application of the "substantial contemplation of
the parties at the time of the contract," which the Alabama courts used
as the relevant test in the prior rulings on the Terminix dispute.5 The

41. 115 S. Ct. at 843.
42. Id. See also Bynum et al., supra note 22, at 9.
43. The two tests are: 1) A broad test which encompassed any contract which affects
interstate commerce (Bynum et al., supra note 22, at 10) and; 2) A more restrictive test
which would include any contract which contemplated substantial interstate commerce at
the time the contract was entered into. 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 1961) (Lumbard, CJ,

concurring).
44.

115 S. Ct. at 842.

45. U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 8. The fact that the FAA was passed pursuant to the
Commerce Clause is seen through the case law development.
46. The question remains: what is the significance of the word "involving"? Commerce
Clause jurisprudence had developed "affecting" as the appropriate term of art. This

inconsistency could be explained because the FAA was passed before "affecting" became an
established term of art.
47. 115 S. Ct. at 842.
48, Id.
49.

Id. at 840.

50. Id. at 837.
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Supreme Court explained that the test the Alabama courts applied was
unrealistic. The test relied on what the parties included at the time the
contract was finalized."' If a reference to interstate commerce was
found, the arbitration clause in the contract would be enforceable under
section 2 of the FAA. On the other hand, the parties would be prevented
from utilizing an arbitration clause in their contract merely because they
did not contemplate interstate commerce at the time of contracting. The
Court continued to explain that the substantial contemplation test would
only invite litigation about what was and what was not contemplated at
the time of the contract.52 The Court could not reconcile the test with
the literal language of section 2 of the FAA. It found no language in the
section which required the parties to contemplate interstate commerce
at the time of the contract; the section merely required a transaction
involving interstate commerce. 3 The second holding in Terminix
reinforced the applicability of the FAA in state courts as established in
Southland Corp. v. Keating."' The Court reiterated the reasoning of
the decision in Southland; that the FAA was not passed under the power
of Article III of the United States Constitution,5 5 but instead under the
power of the Commerce Clause."' The Court in Dobson explained that
Southland is well established law and there have been no intervening
reasons to overrule Southland."7 Overruling Southland would disturb
the expectations of parties who have relied on that decision in drafting
their own contracts and arbitration clauses. 58 Congress could have
taken action in the thirteen years since Southland if they did not agree
with the Court's decision. However, this was not the case. The decision
in Terminix reinforced that section 2 of the FAA was applicable to

51. Id. at 842.
52. Id.

53. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
54. 115 S. Ct. at 840.
55. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
56. 115 S. Ct. at 841 (referring to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 8). Although the Supreme
Court holds clearly in Southland that the FAA was enacted pursuant to the Commerce
Clause, the Act's legislative history is ambiguous on where the power to enact came from.
Jon R. Schumacher, The Reach of the Federal Arbitration Act: Implications on State

ProceduralLaw, 70 N.D. L. REV. 459 (1994). Congress felt its authority to enact such a law
was "ample." Id. at 461. An argument can be made that the procedural sections of the
FAA refer specifically to the federal courts and thus the conclusion can be drawn that the
entire Act was pursuant to Article III of the Constitution. However, it would be
inconsistent to believe that certain sections would be passed pursuant to different
congressional powers.
57. 115 S. Ct. at 839.
58. Id.
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contract actions in state court, where the contract contains an arbitration clause and in fact involves interstate commerce.
The decision in Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v. Dobson5" is likely
to increase the use of arbitration as a form of alternative dispute
resolution. The major criticism of the decision in Terminix is that the
FAA preempts state substantive law.' Contracts, and the remedies
associated with breach, have typically been subject to state substantive
law. Since this decision, an arbitration clause in a contract will be
removed from state jurisdiction and subjected to federal substantive law.
A broad application of the FAA will infringe on areas which state
legislatures have felt should not be submitted to arbitration.6 1 This will
impact states with anti-arbitration statutes most heavily,62 but the
decision will have ramifications for all states. The FAA will have a
stronger effect in those states which continue to resist arbitration.
However, this effect is consistent with a federal law designed to displace
state judicial hostility towards arbitration agreements.0
Some
proponents of this criticism argue that Congress did not express a clear
intention, at the time of enactment, to preempt existing state law." If
Congressional intent was clear at the time of enactment, critics may
wonder why it has taken seventy years to make this intent clear. The
legislative history on the passage of the FAA is limited, and the history
that does exist shows no express intent to preempt state law. 65 The

legislative history shows an intent to overcome the common law
presumption to enforce arbitration awards" but not agreements to

59.

115 S. Ct. 834 (1995).

60. Bynum et al., supra note 22, at 13.

In arguments before the United States

Supreme Court, 20 state attorneys general submitted amici curiae briefs requesting the
Court to overrule Southland and not to apply the FAA in state courts. Westlaw Lawprac
Index, High Court DecisionStriking State Rule, CouldBoost the Use ofArbitration Clauses,
13 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31 (March 1995).

61. Strickland, supra note 35, at 420. See also Bynum et al., supra note 22, at 15.
62. Strickland, supra note 35, at 420.
63. Br. for Pet'r at 9, Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995) (1994
WL 198822).
64. Strickland, supra note 35, at 389. See also Harry Baum & Leon Pressman, The
Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts (pts. 1 & 2), 8

N.Y.U. L. REV. 238, 242 (1930-31).
65. Baum & Pressman, supra note 64, at 240-42.
66. Id. The FAA does not contain the requisite "clear Congressional statement" that
would be necessary to justify intrusion into state sovereignty. Br. for Resp't at 11, AlliedBruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995) (1994 WL 381849). See New York
v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct, 2395 (1991); and

Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
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arbitrate."7 The House Committee on the Judiciary report indicates
that the congressional power for the bill came from both Article III and
the Commerce Clause." The remainder of the report, though, refers to
the Act as only being applied in federal courts."9 There is evidence that
the FAA was passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause,70 but there is
no support found in the limited legislative history that the FAA was to
apply in both state and federal courts. There may be a concern that
since contracts are historically governed by state law, parties to a
contract contemplate the enforcement of that contract under state law.
The application of the FAA would not be expected by the parties to such
a contract. This criticism was foreseen by the enacting legislature.
Congressional intent at that time was to eliminate the resistance to the
enforcement of an arbitration clause.71 The goal of the FAA, as
described in the legislative history, obviously involves the preemption of
some state law. 72 Additionally, Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v.
67. H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924); S. Rep. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1924). The issue was not even raised in law review articles at the time of passage
of the FAA. One article said,
Conflicts between the federal and state laws will undoubtedly arise in the future.
If interstate commerce is involved, then of course arbitration must take place in
accordance with the Federal Act. Difficulty will often arise in solving this
question ofjurisdiction. Very many contacts are on the border line between intraand inter-state transactions.
36 YALE L.J. 667, 671 (1927).
68. H. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924).
The purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforceable agreements for
arbitration contained in contracts involving interstate commerce or within the
jurisdiction or admiralty, or which may be the subject of litigation in the Federal
Courts. The bill declares that such agreements shall be recognized and enforced
by the courts of the United States. The remedy is founded also upon the Federal
control over interstate commerce reaches not only the actual physical interstate
shipment of goods but also contracts relating to interstate commerce.
Id Additionally, commentators cannot agree on which power Congress relied on for the
passage of the FAA. See supra note 45 (FAA was passed pursuant to the Commerce
Clause). Julius H. Cohen & Kenneth Drayton, The New FederalArbitrationLaw, 12 VA.
L. REV. 265 (1926) (FAA was passed pursuant to Article III power).
69.
Whether an agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a question of
procedure to be determined by the law court in which the proceeding is brought
and not one of substantive law to be determined by the law of the forum in which
the contract is made. The bill declares simply that such agreements for
arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in Federal courts for their
enforcement.
H. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 & 2 (1924).
70. Id.
71. 115 S.Ct. at 838.
72. Id.
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Dobson78 is not the first case in which the FAA has been applied to
state courts. Over a decade ago, the Court decided Southland, which
held that the FAA created a body of federal substantive law which would
The decision in Allied-Bruce
preempt contravening state law. 74
Terminix Companies v. Dobson has now defined how far the FAA will
preempt state law and clarified the Southland holding. 75 The commerce in fact test will now be the standard applied in all courts. No
longer will the applicable test vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and
thus the preemption of state law will be consistent. The FAA will not
significantly affect state sovereignty, because the FAA only preempts a
small, closely defined area of state law: the enforceability of arbitration
clauses. State contract law still regulates all other aspects of contracts,
including fraud, duress, and unconscionability.7" Additionally, concerned parties could agree not to arbitrate or to have state law apply to
all provisions of the contract and thus protect their desire not to have
the FAA applied to the transaction.77 Another criticism of the FAA is
that widespread application of the FAA will serve to limit individuals'
right to a jury trial as well as the right to appeal. 7' This criticism may
be true, but the individual has notice that arbitration will be used for
any dispute. The individual signed the contract which contained the
arbitration clause. If the individual was unaware of the arbitration
clause, the contract could be held unenforceable for a variety of reasons:
fraud, if one party did not disclose the existence of the clause; unconscionability, if the contract is one of adhesion; an individual does not waive
constitutional rights without clear knowledge, as well as other theories
which would depend upon the facts of each individual case. Parties can
also easily agree to exclude issues from arbitration. 79 Therefore, the
FAA does not impose arbitration where the parties have not contemplated it. The FAA will only apply when the parties have included an
arbitration clause in the contract. The FAA only makes arbitration
enforceable as the parties desired, overcoming any state law barriers.
The decision in Terminix could increase the use of arbitration clauses
and thus increase the use of arbitration since parties know the FAA will
mandate enforceability. Arbitration clauses will be presumptively valid
73. Id.
74. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
75. 115 S. Ct. 834.
76. . Bynum et al., supra note 22, at 14.
77. ROBERT R. RODMAN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION WITH FORMS, Ch. 3 Common Law
and Statutory Arbitration, § 3.9 Nature and Purpose of United States Arbitration Act (1995

Supp.).
78. Bynum et al., supra note 22, at 14.
79. RODMAN, supra note 77.
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according to federal law.8" Arbitration will become more widespread as
an alternative to litigation due to this presumption. A broader
application of the FAA will make enforcement of such clauses more
consistent. Therefore, arbitration clauses will be less likely to be thrown
out during a battle of the forms.8 ' There are many benefits to increased arbitration over litigation, especially in small contract disputes.
For example, arbitration is cheaper,8 2 faster, and more flexible than
litigation. 3 Arbitration can give small consumers a more accessible
way to challenge a big corporation. Arbitration also allows the parties
to choose knowledgeable decision makers for their controversies. ' Not
only will arbitration become more prevalent as a form of dispute
resolution, but the decision in Terminix will decrease litigation over the
applicability of the FAA. The test is now clearly defined, so lower courts
can apply the test, thus decreasing appeals. Basing the test on the
Commerce Clause allows parties to rely on established Commerce Clause
jurisprudence." Additionally, the test will be clear for lawyers to use
when drafting documents and when disputes arise. As the litigation
over the FAA decreases, the benefits of arbitration will be reinforced.
Contract disputes will now be resolved in a more efficient manner.'
The benefits of increased arbitration due to the decision in Terminix
outweigh any minimal intrusion upon state sovereignty, especially since
the intent of the FAA was to decrease common law hostility toward
arbitration agreements.
LAuRI WASHINGTON SAWYER

80. Strickland, supra note 35, at 406-07.
81. Bynum et al., supra note 22, at 8.
82. Id. at 14.
83. David P. Pierce, The FederalArbitrationAct: ConflictingInterpretationsofits Scope,
61 U. CIN. L. REv. 623, 625 (1992).
84. Henry C. Strickland, Allied-Bruce Terminix, Inc. v. Dobson: Widespread
Enforcement ofArbitrationAgreements Arrives in Alabama, 56 ALA. LAW. 241 (July 1995).
85. Br. for Pet'r at 19, Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995)
(1994 WL 198822).
86. Strickland, supra note 35, at 455.

